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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Illinois Constitution expressly recognizes an equality right
for all persons, allowing the legislature only to make reasonable exemp-
tions, can the legislature exempt lots of folks for little or no reason? The
General Assembly has answered this question in the affirmative in the Hu-
man Rights Act, with high court deference. We answer no.
In exploring this question, we will examine the equal protection and
antidiscrimination provisions of sections 2, 17, 18, and 19 of article I of the
Illinois Constitution that were added in 1970. Part Two of the paper will
briefly examine the history behind the 1970 equality provisions. Part Three
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of Law and Laura Lee is law clerk to the Honorable Kathryn E. Zenoff. The authors thank
Amy Miller and Professors Frank Lima and Ann Lousin for their help but take full responsi-
bility for any errors. A portion of this article, see infra Part II, which was written by Jeffrey
A. Parness, can also be found in a constitutional piece recently published by the Charleston
Law Review. See Jeffrey A. Parness, Greater Employment Equalities in the New South
Through New Constitutional Guarantees, 3 CHARLESTON L. REv. 461, 466-69, 472 (2009).
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will generally review constitutional rights in Illinois, providing context for
examining the new equality provisions. Part Four will review the particular
promises of equality in 1970. Part Five will examine General Assembly
implementation. Part Six will explore judicial precedents. Finally, Part
Seven will suggest how Illinois lawmakers should better promote equality
in order to realize more fully the expectations of the constitutional drafters
and the electorate in 1970.
II. THE MOVE TO PROMOTE EQUALITY UNDER THE 1970 ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION
In Illinois, three constitutions preceded the current 1970 Illinois Con-
stitution.' The 1818 Illinois Constitution was drafted and debated within
three weeks2 in order to achieve the goal of statehood status before Mis-
souri. Written as a "frontier constitution" by inexperienced drafters, it
chiefly adopted existing provisions from other American constitutions.4
Because the goal was to attain statehood quickly, there was little concern
about ratification by the people.5 Approval by the United States Congress
and the President, required for statehood, was accomplished in 1818.6 The
Bill of Rights in the 1818 Illinois Constitution contained no equal protec-
tion or nondiscrimination provision.
7
Soon, shortcomings resulting from haste became apparent. A vote for
a new constitutional convention failed in 1824.8 A convention call was ap-
proved by a majority of voters actually casting a ballot in 1842. 9 The af-
firmative votes fell short of the numbers required, however, because those
1. ILL. CONST. of 1870; ILL. CONST. of 1848; ILL. CONST. of 1818.
2. JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970, at 10 (1972).
3. Id. Missouri, expected to be admitted as a slave state, was viewed as a competi-
tor by both those favoring and those opposing slavery in Illinois. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 11 ("Wholesale borrowing can be seen in the preamble.").
5. Id. at 18-19 ("Although some states were submitting their proposed constitu-
tions to a popular vote ... no suggestion of such a procedure seems to have been made in
Illinois.").
6. Id. at 19-20 (noting that President Monroe signed the resolution to admit Illinois
after much debate in the House of Representatives on the slavery issue).
7. While the 1818 Illinois Constitution had no general or special equal protec-
tion/nondiscrimination provision, it did declare that "all men are born equally free and inde-
pendent," ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VIII, § 1, and that "elections shall be free and equal," id.
§ 5. It seemingly did not contemplate equality for women (or nonwhites, perhaps), as a right
to vote was recognized for "all white male inhabitants." Id. § 12.
8. CORNELIUS, supra note 2, at 23. Although Illinois had been admitted to the
union as a free state, the goal of this failed convention call was to change the constitution to
allow slavery. Id. at 20. Interestingly, Illinois had once been a colony of Virginia. Id at 5.
9. Id at28.
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not voting at all were counted as negative.10 The voters finally prompted a
convention in 1846.11 The underlying concern was that the 1818 Illinois
Constitution had become ineffective due to increased population, changing
demographics, and financial difficulties arising from an overly zealous leg-
islature. 12 A new constitution became effective in 1848.13 Because individ-
ual rights were of little concern then, the 1848 Illinois Constitution con-
tained a "substantially unchanged" bill of rights.
14
An 1856 convention call is said to have failed primarily due to lack of
newspaper attention. 15 Although increased publicity resulted in a successful
convention call in 1860,16 the resulting proposal did not gain ratification in
1862.17 The voters again approved a convention call in 1868,18 which re-
sulted in a new constitution in 1870.19 While longer and more detailed, the
1870 Constitution contained a bill of rights similar to its predecessors.20
Broad equality provisions were nowhere to be found.21
The 1870 Constitution remained in place for a century. As many years
passed, Kenneth Sears warned "that Illinois was probably in the worst posi-
tion constitutionally of any state in the Union., 22 A long journey toward
constitutional reform truly began in the 1940s in Chicago with the forma-
tion of the Committee on Constitutional Revision of the Chicago Bar Asso-
10. Id. Consider also that the amendment process outlined in the Illinois Constitu-
tion of 1870, article XIV, section 2, stated that adoption required a majority of those voting
at the election to vote for an amendment. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, § 2. Thus, those
voting in the election that chose not to vote on the amendment issue would be counted as
"no" votes. On the other hand, the 1970 Illinois Constitution requires a three-fifths majority
by those voting on the amendment question, which was provided on a separate ballot. ILL.
CONST. art. XIV, § 2(b). Therefore, voters choosing not to vote on the amendment issue did
not affect the outcome either way.
11. CORNELIUS, supra note 2, at 29.
12. Id. at 25-27 (noting that there was also interest, "in accordance with the national
trend toward popular control of government," in changing some state offices from appoint-
ive to elective).
13. Id. at44.
14. Id. at 40.
15. Id. at 45-46 ("That year political attention centered on the bitter state and na-
tional elections, where a major party alignment was taking place.").
16. CORNELIUS, supra note 2, at 46. Newspapers warned the voters that failure to
cast a ballot on the constitutional issue would be counted as a vote against it. Id
17. Id. at 54. The 1862 Constitution was defeated mainly because of the ongoing
Civil War and mutual charges of disloyalty by the partisan groups. Id.
18. Id. at 59.
19. Id. at83.
20. Id. at 65.
21. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II.
22. ELMER GERTZ & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FOR A NEW AGE: AN INSIDE
VIEW OF THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 8 (1980). Sears was a University
of Chicago constitutional scholar. Id.
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ciation.23 The march ended with an overwhelming voter call in 1968 for
another constitutional convention.24 Interestingly, a new bill of rights was
not part of the initial agenda.25 Yet, a Bill of Rights Committee nevertheless
was formed.26 This Committee began its work by studying similar bills in
other states, the Model State Constitution, and scholarly articles.27 Four new
equality provisions emerged.2
In approving the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the people adopted equal-
ity provisions within the Bill of Rights quite different from, not only earlier
Illinois provisions, 29 but also from provisions in most other American state
constitutions. 30 The 1970 Illinois Bill of Rights includes two explicit equal
protection provisions31 and two explicit antidiscrimination provisions.
3
2
Given earlier difficulties in undertaking constitutional reforms in Illinois
through the General Assembly, 33 as well as the historical lack of independ-
ent state constitutional interpretation by the Illinois courts, 34 the 1970 initia-
tives were quite significant. 35 They replaced a stagnant Illinois constitu-
23. Id. at 6. Chicago lawyer, Sam Witwer, was Chair. Id.
24. CORNELIUS, supra note 2, at 144.
25. ELMER GERTZ, FOR THE FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILL OF
RIGHTS 7 (1972).
26. GERTZ & PiScIOTrE, supra note 22, at 66.
27. GERTZ, supra note 25, at 7-15.
28. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 17-19.
29. Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution: Has It Made A Difference?, 8 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 571, 599 (1988) ("The 1870 Constitution had guaranteed due process of law,
but not equal protection of the laws.").
30. Elmer Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations of Article I, Section 17, 11 J.
MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 283, 283 (1978) (stating that the new bill of rights contained
the "strongest nondiscrimination provisions of any state constitution").
31. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 18.
32. Id. §§ 17, 19.
33. Samuel W. Witwer, Introduction, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 567, 567 (1988) (conclud-
ing that the 1870 Illinois Constitution became "virtually unamendable"). The 1970 Illinois
Constitution included for the first time an "automatic 20-year question," whereby a possible
constitutional convention would be placed on the general election ballot every twenty years
in the absence of General Assembly action. Id (citing ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1(b)). Previ-
ously, the General Assembly had sole discretion to convene a constitutional convention. Id.
34. Brannon P. Denning, Survey of Illinois Law: Constitutional Law, 25 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 733, 758 (2001). The lockstep doctrine indicates a state high court generally applies
United States Supreme Court analysis of the Federal Constitution when deciding state con-
stitutional questions involving similar provisions. 14 ILL. LAW AND PRAc. Courts § 94
(2008).
35. Gertz, supra note 30, at 283.
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tional doctrine36 that failed to fulfill the distinctive role of state constitu-
tionalism in the federal system.
37
American state constitutions should play a key role in protecting indi-
viduals.38 Expanded state constitutional law protections differ from the uni-
form protections afforded by federal lawmakers. While the Federal Consti-
tution contains individual rights implied through the recognition of federal
and state governments with express, but limited, powers, state constitutions
often "contain positive or affirmative rights. 39 State constitutions can also
speak to private (or nongovernmental) conduct, as in two of the 1970 Illi-
nois equality provisions.
Because of their smaller scale, in constitutional matters states are more
able "to experiment, to improvise, [and] to test new theories. 'A Thus, if "a
state experiment succeeds, others may follow," and if it "fails, only one of
50 states is affected. ' 41 As well, because they are easier to amend than the
42Federal Constitution, state constitutions can more quickly respond to
failed experiments, social changes, and societal needs.43
A state constitutional provision on individual rights can be independ-
ent from the Federal Constitution in that it can extend protections beyond
those compelled nationally." Even where federal and state constitutional
36. GERTZ & PlsciorrE, supra note 22, at 3-6 (viewing the Illinois Constitution as
antiquated).
37. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977) (stating that state courts have a "mani-
fest purpose... to expand constitutional protections").
38. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions As Guardians ofIndividual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 552 (1986) (stating
that federalism protects individual rights at both the state and federal level).
39. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as
Unique Legal Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 189, 192 (2002). In other words, since
the federal government is limited to acting only where it is specifically authorized by the
Constitution to do so, "federal constitutional rights are primarily negative in nature." Id.
40. Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Protecting Individual Rights,
8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 651, 652 (1988) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
41. Brennan, supra note 38, at 550 (explaining that states are political and social
laboratories). This has been recognized by others on the United States Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
42. Williams, supra note 39, at 228.
43. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Judicial Federalism: Current Trends and Long-Term
Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1053, 1084-85 (1992) ("Rights of privacy, environmental
protection provisions, equal rights guarantees, and other innovative reforms have been found
in recent additions to state constitutions.").
44. Brennan, supra note 37, at 491 (stating that state constitutions serve as "a font
of individual liberties").
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provisions are similar, their interpretations can be different.45 In the 1960s
many in Illinois believed that their lawmakers had failed to adequately pro-
tect individual equality interests by not creating explicit new laws46 and by
not independently interpreting the Illinois Constitution.47
The 1970 constitutional initiatives promised greater equality in vary-
ing settings. In the three major equality initiatives, the protections extended
far beyond any protections in the Federal Constitution, prompting the need
for independent, state constitutional interpretation.48 The delegates to the
Sixth Constitutional Convention in Illinois hoped the new Bill of Rights
provisions in 1970 would help eliminate discrimination,49 the "slavery" of
the day. 50 They projected that newly recognized freedoms from discrimina-
tion in employment and housing would elevate equality to the same status
as other constitutional rights, like free speech and free worship.5' The
Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee for the Convention, Elmer Gertz,
remarked that the strength of the equality provisions were "surprising,"
given that "Illinois was the last large northern industrial state to enact a fair
employment practices law" and that it had never passed "open housing leg-
islation.,
52
45. Id. at 495 (stating that independent interpretations are possible even when state
constitutional rights are "identically phrased"). For an example of the factors used by courts
in determining whether to extend broader rights under a state constitution than are required
by the Federal Constitution, see Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-813 (Wash.
1986) (listing "six nonexclusive neutral criteria").
46. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II.
47. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, The Illinois Bill of Rights and Our Independent
Legal Tradition: A Critique of the Illinois Lockstep Doctrine, 12 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 10 (1987)
(stating that in following U.S. Supreme Court holdings on "identical issues," Illinois courts
have generally not paused to consider the merits of the underlying constitutional questions).
At times outside of Illinois, state courts are constitutionally barred from independent state
constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (discussing "pupil school as-
signment or pupil transportation"); id. § 24 (discussing the rights of criminal defendants and
minors in juvenile proceedings); see also R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (addressing abortion and
abortion funding).
48. See, e.g., York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 999-1006
(Wash. 2008). Because of the "stark differences in the language," id. at 999, of the federal
and state constitutions, the court declines to "adopt a doctrine similar to the federal special
needs exception in the context of randomly drug testing student athletes," id. at 1006.
49. GERTZ, supra note 25, at 170 ("I am proud indeed that we in Illinois have gone
beyond all other states and the federal government in eliminating discrimination.").
50. 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1592
(1970) (introduction by Elmer Gertz, Chairman, Bill of Rights Committee) [hereinafter 3
PROCEEDINGS].
51. Id. at 1593 (equating the right to be free from discrimination with "freedom of
speech, freedom to assemble, freedom to worship, due process of law"); id. at 1598 (stating
intent to "raise to constitutional stature . . . anti-discrimination in these two very important
areas").
52. Gertz, supra note 30, at 283.
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Beyond the expectations of the delegates, there were the hopes of the
people.53 State constitutions are often unique in that they "owe their legal
validity and political legitimacy to the state electorate," not just to the fram-
ers. 54 In contrast to statutes, where the only direct role of the people is in the
election of representatives, constitutional revisions frequently require that
people vote to call a convention, elect delegates, and then approve the final
product. 55 Such voter involvement makes it much more difficult to change a
constitution than it is to create, amend, or repeal a statute.56 A state consti-
tution is the "highest source of law" in the state.57
In 1970, the people, as well as the Convention delegates, called for
significant expansions of equality. Expectations arose from the four distinct
equality provisions added to the Illinois Bill of Rights, effective July 1,
1971. Section 2 of article I contains the general proposition that no person
shall be "denied the equal protection of the laws. 58 Section 17 embodies
more particular assurances and the strongest of the guarantees of equality. It
says:
Section 17. No discrimination in Employment and the Sale
or Rental of Property
All persons shall have the right to be free from dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national an-
cestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the
General Assembly, but the General Assembly by law may
establish reasonable exemptions relating to these rights and
provide additional remedies for their violation.59
Sections 18 and 19 are also more particular about equality than section
2, though seemingly less protective than section 17 since they do not con-
tain self-executing clauses. These two sections say:
53. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 39, at 194; Samuel W. Witwer, Introduction to
JANET CORNELIUS, CONSTITUTION MAKING IN ILLINOIS, 1818-1970 xi, xii (1972) ("American
constitutions are indeed people's documents.").
54. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 39, at 194; Witwer, supra note 53, at xii.
55. GERTZ & PiscioTTE, supra note 22, at 22.
56. Williams, supra note 39, at 229; Witwer, supra note 53, at xi ("Americans see a
constitution as something which should rest upon a more certain basis than tradition, custom,
and precedent.").
57. Williams, supra note 39, at 229.
58. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 2.
59. Id. § 17.
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Section 18. No Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or
abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of local
government and school districts.
Section 19. No Discrimination Against the Handicapped
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be
free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property
and shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in
60the hiring and promotion practices of any employer.
Unfortunately, the people and the delegates have been disappointed by
both the Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois Supreme Court. The
General Assembly enacted the Illinois Human Rights Act to implement the
new equal protection and antidiscrimination provisions. 61 But in doing so, it
fell short in protecting all persons by unduly restricting those who can seek
remedies for equality violations.62 As well, the Illinois Supreme Court has
paid too much deference to the General Assembly. As a result, many who
suffer inequalities addressed by new constitutional provisions are left reme-
diless.63 Thirty years after Elmer Gertz lamented that the new provisions of
1970 were still "unrealized expectations," 64 little has changed. The expecta-
tions of the delegates and the people should not be forgotten. Greater equal-
ity is long overdue. After briefly reviewing Illinois constitutional rights and
the goals behind the new equality provisions, legislative and judicial fail-
ures in promoting equality will be exposed and reforms will be suggested.
III. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN ILLINOIS
The 1970 amendments to the Illinois Constitution expressly recog-
nized several new equality principles. They joined other express Illinois
constitutional rights. All Illinois constitutional rights, however, are not
themselves equal. Before looking more particularly to the 1970 equal pro-
tection and antidiscrimination provisions, a general overview of other Illi-
nois constitutional rights is in order as it will facilitate a better understand-
60. Id. §§ 18-19.
61. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 (2008).
62. Within the definitions sections, the General Assembly has limited the persons
covered by the protections of the Act. Id. at 5/2-101 to -102.
63. Lousin, supra note 29, at 602 ("In effect, then, there is no longer a constitutional
remedy against employment discrimination in Illinois.").
64. Gertz, supra note 30, at 283.
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ing of the four new provisions and the proper legislative and judicial ap-
proaches to their use.
A. EXPRESS RIGHTS
Of the twenty-four sections now in the Illinois Bill of Rights, eleven
employ the term "right., 65 These sections can be divided into two main
types distinguished by the contemplated role for the General Assembly. The
first category includes sections for which there is no expressly articulated
legislative role. The second contains sections explicitly recognizing at least
some General Assembly responsibility.
The first category includes constitutional rights encompassing the fol-
lowing:
* The "inherent and inalienable rights" of "life, liberty and the pur-
suit of happiness" of section 166
* The "right to assemble and petition" of section 567
* The "right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and other
possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of
privacy or interceptions of communication by eavesdropping de-
vices or other means" of section 668
" The "right [of an accused] to appear and defend in person and by
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation and
have a copy thereof; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him or her and to have process to compel the attendance of wit-
nesses in his or her behalf; and to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed" of section 869
• Other rights "retained by the individual citizens" despite their ab-
sence from express recognition in article I, under section 2470
As well, the "right of trial by jury" under section 13 is to "remain invio-
late, 71 seemingly precluding significant General Assembly action. Other
rights in article I expressly permit, or even require, General Assembly ac-
tion. Legislation may include defining the right or providing for its en-
forcement. For example, the "right of the individual citizen to keep and bear
65. Although section 3 states that "no person shall be denied any civil or political
right ... on account of his religious opinions," it is excluded from this discussion because its
focus is on "religious freedom" rather than on a right (though, in practice, a freedom may be
quite similar to a right in its content and enforcement opportunities). ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3.
66. Id. § 1.
67. Id. § 5.
68. Id. §6.
69. Id. §8.
70. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 24.
71. Id. § 13.
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arms," under section 22, is expressly subject "to the police power., 7 2 The
section 8.1 "right to restitution" seemingly is even more dependent upon
legislation since both the nature of the right itself and its "enforcement" are
to be provided by law.73
There are express constitutional rights outside of article I which also
approach General Assembly responsibilities differently. For example, arti-
cle VI, section 4 expressly recognizes certain appeals from both the trial
courts and the intermediate appellate courts to the Supreme Court "as a
matter of right." 74 Likewise, article VI, section 6 states that certain appeals
from the trial courts to the intermediate appellate courts are "a matter of
right., 75 Article VI is silent on action by the legislature. Similarly silent are
the provisions on the "pension and retirement rights" recognized in article
XIII, section 5.76 Such rights encompass "an enforceable contractual rela-
tionship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired., 77 Here,
the role of the General Assembly seems limited, while significant judicial
enforcement responsibilities are implied.
Other Illinois constitutional rights outside of article I specifically an-
ticipate legislation. Article III, section 1 recognizes a "right to vote" that
may be subject to statutory registration and residency requirements.78 The
role of the General Assembly in suffrage and election is recognized in arti-
cle III, section 4, which declares that the General Assembly "shall define
permanent residence for voting purposes, insure secrecy of voting and the
integrity of the election process, and facilitate registration and voting by all
qualified persons. 79 It also says statutes on "voter registration and conduct
of elections must be general and uniform., 80 Section 5 delegates election
supervision to a State Board of Elections whose "size, manner of selection
and compensation" shall be determined "by law.",8' Finally, section 6 of
article III designates a particular day for the election of the General Assem-
bly itself "or on such other day as provided by law. 82
72. Id. § 22.
73. Id. § 8.1(a) (stating "rights," including "restitution" for "crime victims," "as
provided by law"); id. § 8.1(b) (noting such rights are subject to "enforcement" as provided
by the General Assembly).
74. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b)-(c).
75. Id. §6.
76. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
77. Id.




82. Id. § 6; see also ILL. CONST. art. XI, §2 (recognizing a "right to a healthful envi-
ronment" for every person, with enforcement through "legal proceedings subject to reason-
able limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by law").
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B. IMPLICIT RIGHTS
Article I of the Illinois Constitution, labeled the "Bill of Rights," has
several sections which seemingly recognize what most would deem rights
even though the term "right" appears more obliquely, or not at all. For ex-
ample, in section 12, called "Right to Remedy and Justice," there is a rec-
ognized entitlement to "a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and
wrongs" as well as to "obtain justice by law, freely, completely and
promptly., 83 In section 15, called "Right of Eminent Domain," there is a
recognized entitlement, upon the exercise of "eminent domain," to "just
compensation as provided by law," to be determined by a jury.
84
Some article I sections that fail to employ the term "right" in either the
title or text nevertheless yield what most would regard as rights. Thus, sec-
tion 10, entitled "Self-Incrimination and Double Jeopardy," simply says
that no person in a criminal case "shall be compelled ... to give evidence
against himself nor be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 85 And
section 2, entitled "Due Process and Equal Protection," says no person
"shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. 86
Outside article I there are additional implicit constitutional rights.
Many expressly limit government. For example, the general obligation of
government to make records and proceedings available to the public seem-
ingly implies a right of access. Similarly, article IV, section 5 declares that
sessions of the General Assembly and meetings of its committees "shall be
open to the public," though closure is permitted if there is a two-thirds vote
involving "the public interest., 87 Article IV, section 7 requires the legisla-
ture to provide "reasonable public notice of meetings" 88 and "to keep a
journal of its proceedings and a transcript of its debates" that is "available
to the public., 89 Article VIII, section 1 requires that reports and records of
"the obligation, receipt and use of public funds of the State, units of local
government and school districts are public records available for inspection
83. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12. But see People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 30 (I11. App
Ct. 2007) (stating section 12 "is merely an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate").
84. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15. Notably, the right to eminent domain resides in the
government, while the right to just compensation flows to the private property holder subject
to eminent domain. See id.
85. Id. § 10.
86. Id. § 2. Article I also uses other explicit terms to denote what most understand
as rights. Thus, section 9 (entitled "Bail and Habeas Corpus") speaks of a "privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus." Id. § 9. And section 3 (entitled "Religious Freedom") speaks of the
"the liberty of conscience" secured by the "guaranteed" freedom of "exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession and worship, without discrimination." Id. § 3.
87. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 5(c).
88. Id. § 7(a).
89. Id. § 7(b).
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by the public according to law." 90 Finally, a public access right to informa-
tion is implied in article XIII, section 2 which mandates the filing of "a
verified statement" of "economic interests" by a state officeholder and oth-
ers "as provided by law," as well as authorizes the General Assembly by
law to impose a similar filing requirement upon a local government office-
holder and others.9 1 Implicit rights to information held by government mean
that at least certain individuals 92 may sue to enforce access duties.93
Comparable treatment of express and implicit rights often presents no
problems. The U.S. Supreme Court has long approached the "rights" of the
criminally accused, in Amendment VI to the Federal Constitution, compa-
rably to the restraints on government that protect the criminally accused in
Amendment V to the Federal Constitution.
In Gomez-Perez v. Potter,94 the U.S. Supreme Court recently afforded
comparable treatment of differently worded statutes dealing with equality.
In particular, it ruled that the "plain meaning" of a federal statute guarantee-
ing all U.S. citizens "the same right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens...
to inherit ... property" is to ban "discrimination based on race. ' Thus, as
to whether retaliation claims were included, that statutory right should be
construed like another federal statute that is more explicit about nondis-
crimination, but without a mention of a right, in that it mandates "[a]ll per-
sonnel actions affecting employees... who are at least 40 years of age...
shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.",
96
90. ILL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c); see also Oberman v. Byrne, 445 N.E.2d 374, 380
(Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that to effect the purpose behind the constitutional provision, "it
is necessary that public disclosure be made of specific transactions and not mere disclosure
of the source of the revenue and 'broad direction' to which expenditures went").
91. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
92. The standing to litigate such constitutional claims seemingly encompasses a
broader range of plaintiffs than would have standing in the Federal Article III courts on
comparable federal constitutional claims.
93. Other possible implied rights arising from duties imposed on the government
outside of article I might inhere in article X, section 1, requiring the State to "provide for an
efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and services," with education
"through the secondary level," to be free. ILL CONST. art. X, § 1. Consider also article III,
section 3, requiring that all "elections shall be free and equal." ILL CONST. art. III, § 3. Al-
though there is silence on the General Assembly's role, given the explicit power delegations
to the General Assembly in election processes covered in sections 1, 4, 5, and 6, seemingly
there is implicit legislative responsibility to define and enforce any right to free and equal
elections. See id
94. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
95. Id. at 1936 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2008)).
96. Id. at 1942 (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2000 & Supp.
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C. ENFORCEMENT OF EXPRESS RIGHTS WITH AND WITHOUT A SELF-
EXECUTION CLAUSE
Constitutions may not invite significant, or even any, legislation defin-
ing or enforcing certain constitutional fights. Here, constitutional claims
can often then be pursued directly in court, as when the fights are self-
executing. Article I, section 17 of the Illinois Constitution has a self-
execution clause. It declares certain antidiscrimination rights "are enforce-
able without action by the General Assembly," though legislation may es-
tablish "reasonable exemptions" and "provide additional remedies. 97 En-
forcement by lawsuits, absent any enabling legislation, is contemplated.
When a constitutional fight is not accompanied by an express self-
execution clause, Illinois courts have still found that at least some justicia-
ble claims are contemplated. 98 In People ex rel. Wanless v. City of Chi-
cago,99 the eminent domain "right" was at issue. The right, now found in
article I, section 15, says: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation as provided by law. Such compen-
sation shall be determined by a jury as provided by law." °100 The court held,
notwithstanding the recognized roles of the state and local legislatures in
addressing some matters of compensation and court procedure, that the
"constitutional requirement is self-executing, and neither requires any legis-
lation for its enforcement nor is susceptible of impairment by legislation or
ordinance."' ' Seemingly, for property "taken or damaged for public use,"
there must be some reasonable form of compensation, with a jury available
for assessment.
97. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
98. As with constitutional rights, constitutional limits on governmental authority
can be self-executing. In Phillips v. Quick, 63 Ill. 445 (1872), a city charter conferred juris-
diction on a police magistrate in the sum of $500 though a constitutional provision said
jurisdiction should be "uniform" and a state statute limited jurisdiction to $100. Id at 446-47.
A police magistrate judgment for over $300 was reversed, id. at 449, with the court ruling
that where constitutional provisions are "negative or prohibitory . . .they execute them-
selves," id. at 447. Thus, where a governmental power is limited constitutionally, or where a
governmental act is prohibited, the court observed that "no one would contend that the
power might be exercised or the act performed until prohibited by the general assembly." Id.
at 448. The court further observed that where the constitution "requires the performance of
an act," but provides no means of enforcement, then the constitution does not self execute.
Id.
99. 38 N.E.2d 743 (I11. 941).
100. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15. At the time of Wanless, article II, section 13 of the
Illinois Constitution said: "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation. Such compensation, when not made by the State, should be
ascertained by a jury, and shall be prescribed by law." Wanless, 38 N.E.2d at 746 (quoting
ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13).
101. Wanless, 38 N.E.2d at 746 (relying on earlier precedents).
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Similar approaches were urged in AIDA v. Time Warner Entertainment
Co., but there was a different result. The American Italian Defense Associa-
tion (AIDA) sought declaratory relief against Time Warner because its tele-
vision show, The Sopranos, "breached" the Individual Dignity Clause of the
Illinois Constitution.' ' 0 2 That clause, which is located in article I, section
20, states in full: "To promote individual dignity, communications that por-
tray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or that incite violence, ha-
tred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of persons by reason of or
by reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are
condemned."'
10 3
The AIDA court found section 20 was completely "hortatory."'04 It re-
lied on the earlier Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., case, where another appellate
district court looked to the legislative history, specifically a Bill of Rights
Committee Report, which stated:
[Again [Victor Arrigo, the provision's supervisor] want to
reiterate, the individual dignity clause in no way qualifies
or modifies the constitutional rights of free speech and
press.] The provision creates no private right or cause of
action . . . . It is purely hortatory, "a constitutional ser-
mon." Like a preamble, such a provision is not an operative
part of the Constitution. It is included to serve a teaching
purpose, to state an ideal or principle to guide the conduct
of government and individual citizens. 105
So a constitutional condemnation of certain conduct can be "merely an ex-
pression of philosophy and not a mandate that a certain remedy be provided
in any specific form.',
10 6
A different approach to Illinois constitutional rights unaccompanied by
a self-executing clause was followed in Amati v. City of Woodstock.,
0 7
There, claims were brought under the article I, section 6 provisions, recog-
nizing people's rights to security against unreasonable searches, seizures,
privacy invasions, or eavesdroppings. 0 8 Upon examining Illinois state court
102. AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
103. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 20.
104. AIDA, 772 N.E.2d at 960.
105. Id. at 961 (alteration in original) (citing Irving v. J. L. Marsh, Inc., 360 N.E.2d
983, 984 (I11. App. Ct. 1977)).
106. AIDA, 772 N.E.2d at 961.
107. 829 F. Supp. 998 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
108. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, inva-
sions of privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other
means.").
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precedents as well as constitutional commentary, the court found the claims
would be viable with the use of the article I, section 12 "right to remedy"
for "all wrongs and injuries" in the absence of legislation. 0 9 Yet, because
there was an applicable statute including "a comprehensive civil damage
scheme including actual and punitive damages," there was no "right to
bring a separate action under article I, section 6" of the constitution."0
IV. THE GOALS OF EQUALITY UNDER THE 1970 ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTION
We now examine in greater depth the four separate equality provisions
in the 1970 constitution. One is article I, section 2, theretofore solely a due
process provision. The 1970 change added the statement that no person
shall be "denied the equal protection of the laws.""' This provision appar-
ently was included for good measure, to replicate the Federal Constitution,
or, in the words of Elmer Gertz, "for the sake of completeness."'"12 Perhaps,
it sets forth little more than a "sermon" or a "teaching" tool.'"
Yet, the aspirations of the drafters went beyond simple mimicking of
the Federal Bill of Rights. 14 As Gertz said, "we could not give our citizens
less, but we could give them more."' 1 5 And they did, in sections 17, 18, and
19.
Section 17 does not have a federal counterpart.1 6 It states:
109. Amati, 829 F. Supp. at 1006. In some ways, the "right to remedy" provision thus
might operate like a general self-execution clause for constitutional rights whose provisions
say nothing about implementation. See id.
110. Id. at 1006-07. The court did "not decide whether a party may bring an action
directly under Article I, section 6" for acts that are not addressed within the statutory
scheme. Id. at 1007 n.12.
111. ILL CONST. art. I, § 2.
112. GERTZ, supra note 25, at 9.
113. AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 961 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(describing the "hortatory" nature of the "individual dignity" provisions within article I,
section 20).
114. GERTZ, supra note 25, at 14 (observing that, even for identical provisions, the
Illinois Supreme Court could interpret them to guarantee protections beyond that acknowl-
edged by the United States Supreme Court).
115. Id. at 12.
116. Id. at 102. We have found no very comparable state counterpart, though there
are some state constitutional provisions protecting against some or all of these varying forms
of discrimination (and others). See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (stating no discrimination
based on "race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin"); LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (stating no
discrimination based on "birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition or political ideas or
affiliations"). As well, some state constitutional equality provisions operate in similar or
different contexts. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XV, § 6 (stating equality and nondiscrimina-
tion "in charges or in facilities for transportation of freight or passengers"); MONT. CONST.
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All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, creed, national ancestry and
sex in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer
or in the sale or rental of property. These rights are en-
forceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemp-
tions relating to these rights and provide additional reme-
dies for their violation.l 7
Section 17 is unique in two ways. 118 First, its prohibitions encompass not
only state action, but also private action.119 In contrast, equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides for
only the "equal protection of the laws."'' 20 The debates at the Illinois Consti-
tutional Convention reveal that the delegates had two goals in mind for the
more expansive section 17.121 The first was to recognize the fundamental
nature of the right to be free from discrimination. 122 The second was to pre-
vent "drag" on the Illinois economy by those suffering from discrimina-
tion.1 23 Given these goals, the areas of employment and housing were cho-
sen both because of the past record of discrimination and because they were
most connected to the economy. 24 Since any proposal would ultimately
require voter approval, the delegates also decided to limit the coverage of
section 17 to the areas deemed most likely to be understood by the elector-
ate.'
25
art. II, § 4 (stating the exercise of "civil or political rights"); WYo. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating
equality in "inherent right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness").
117. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
118. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1592 (discussing restriction on private ac-
tions); id. at 1596 (discussing the self-execution clause).
119. Id. at 1592.
120. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (stating it is "state action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the
subject-matter of the [Fourteenth] amendment").
121. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1593 (discussing creation of "very, very basic
rights"); id. at 1594 (noting that § 17 was also "an economic proposal").
122. Id. at 1593 (equating this right with other "very, very basic rights" such as those
found in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
123. Id. at 1594-95 (discussing the effect of discrimination on minorities as resulting
in unemployment or lower pay for the same work as non-minorities). Delegate Kemp noted
that this provides incentive to go on the welfare roll, decreases taxes collected, and increases
crime. Id.
124. Id. at 1595.
125. Id. at 1592 (describing a "rifle-shot approach" rather than "shotgun approach" to
specifically target the two most harmful areas of discrimination).
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Section 17 is also unique because it includes a self-execution clause. 126
The drafters made the rights "enforceable without action by the General
Assembly" to ensure that the new section 17 rights were not merely state-
ments of policy, 127 not simply hortatory, and not just a constitutional ser-
mon. The debates reveal a clear intent by the drafters to recognize a private
cause of action in section 17.128 Since the rights in section 17 arise in the
absence of implementing legislation, courts are authorized to provide judi-
cially-crafted remedies for certain equality violations. 29 The "right to rem-
edy" provision within section 12 covering "all injuries and wrongs" need
not be employed. 1
30
The third new provision on equality parallels somewhat the failed
Federal Equal Rights Amendment.' 3 ' Article I, section 18 states that "the
equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts."'
' 32
Section 18 was included despite protests that it was redundant, given the
section 2 equal protection guarantee 133 and the section 17 protection against
discrimination. 134 Despite the testimony of two female delegates who stated
that they never experienced gender discrimination, 135 the drafters adopted
126. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1596. Other state constitutions do not ap-
proach self-executing rights with the language of section 17. Compare ILL. CONST. art. I, §
17 ("[W]ithout action by the General Assembly .... ), with CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (non-
discrimination section "shall be self-executing"), and TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a (equality
amendment "is self-operative").
127. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1596 (discussing the need to avoid judicial
reluctance for enforcement in the absence of implementing legislation).
128. Id. at 1597.
129. Id. The delegates did not address the implications of the self-execution clause if
the legislature were not to act. As will be seen, this clause was, in fact, applied by the courts
prior to the passage of the implementing legislation for section 17. Following statutory en-
actments, the Illinois courts have not spoken much about the relationship between legislative
action and the self-execution implemented by judicial action.
130. See Amati v. City of Woodstock, 829 F. Supp. 998, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (stat-
ing section 12 would be available to enforce a section 6 claim in the absence of comprehen-
sive legislation, as section 6 has no self-executing clause).
131. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 3674.
132. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18. Other states have somewhat comparable, but at times
very different, constitutional equality provisions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (stating
no state discrimination "in the operation of public employment, public education or public
contracting"); N.J. CONST. art. I, § 5 (stating no segregation "in the militia or in the public
schools").
133. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 3669 (discussing concern that since "[w]omen
have not been treated like 'persons' for such a long time that we prefer to have this matter
spelled out specifically, rather than leaving [it] to a court interpretation").
134. Id. at 3669 (noting that section 17 only covers the areas of housing and em-
ployment, while discrimination against women is more pervasive).
135. Id. at 3674, 3676.
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section 18136 based on the lack of case law applying the equal protection
clause of the Federal Constitution to women, as well as on the unfortunate
tendency of American courts to uphold troubling gender classifications. 
137
Finally, there was added an equality provision applicable only to the
handicapped, 38 a matter not expressly addressed by the Federal Constitu-
tion. 139 Article I, section 19 commands that "[a]ll persons with a physical or
mental handicap shall be free from discrimination in the sale or rental of
property and shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer."' 40 The debates on section
19 reveal some concerns over enacting specifically tailored protections.1
4
1
Some urged that the subject of section 19 was better suited for legisla-
tion.142 Eventually, however, section 19 was adopted. 143 General Assembly
wishes were not paramount.
At the convention there was much concern over securing voter ap-
proval.144 The delegates discussed worries about assuring positive press
coverage. 145 They noted the strong possibility of labor and business opposi-
tion.146 They also noted that the "aura of Judaic-Christian principles that
appears to be the attitude of this convention ... [may not be] pervasive in
all of the Illinois communities."' 147 Equality protections in the private sector
were limited to employment and housing, providing a "pragmatic ap-
proach" that would "be best understood and appreciated by the public at
136. Id. at 3677.
137. Id. at 3676. The discussion had a marked tone of sexism as a few of the dele-
gates finally gave into approval of the provision in order "to give the girls a unanimous
[vote]." Id. at 3677.
138. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 3687 (recording the passage of section 19).
139. There are a few comparable state constitutional equality provisions for those
with handicaps. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (stating no inequality, segregation or
discrimination in the exercise of certain rights because of "physical or mental disability");
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating no deprivation of certain rights based on "physical disabil-
ity"); R.I. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating no state discrimination against "otherwise qualified
person... solely by reason of... handicap").
140. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
141. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 3684, 3686.
142. Id. at 3679.
143. Id. at 3687; see also id. at 3683 (noting that protections existed for "fish, birds,
game, wildlife, the environment, ethnic groups, regional groups, and women," and how it
was impossible not to protect "those persons who are struggling, probably harder than any-
one else.., to become productive members of society").
144. Id. at 3678.
145. Id.
146. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 3686.
147. Id. at 3678.
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large."' 148 The compromises worked as the voters approved a new constitu-
tion on December 15, 1970,149 to take effect July 1, 1971.150
V. UNEQUAL STATUTORY PROMOTION OF EQUALITY SINCE 1970
Prior to 1970 the Illinois General Assembly had enacted some equality
protections, most importantly the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA) in
1961.51 One stated reason for section 17 was to remedy parts of the
FEPA.152 Following the new constitution, the FEPA was amended to in-
clude gender as a basis for illegal employment discrimination.'5 3 Similarly,
other statutes were amended in 1971 to avoid constitutional challenges,
particularly under section 18.154
The initial piecemeal reaction to the 1970 constitution was followed
by the more comprehensive response in the Illinois Human Rights Act of
1979 (HRA or the Act). 55 Effective in 1980, the Act was intended to as-
semble most equal protection and antidiscrimination laws into a single co-
hesive scheme 156 that would implement the new constitutional equality
principles. 57 Thus, the HRA is intended to "secure and guarantee the
rights" established by sections 17, 18, and 19.158 Specifically, the goal of
the HRA is:
[T]o secure for all individuals within Illinois the freedom
from discrimination against any individual because of his
or her race, color, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry,
age, marital status, physical or mental handicap, military
status, sexual orientation, or unfavorable discharge from
military service in connection with employment, real estate
transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability
of public accommodations. 5 9
148. Id. at 1592.
149. John Elmer, New Constitution O.K. 'd, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 16, 1970, at 1.
150. Id.
151. Gertz, supra note 30, at 284.
152. Id. at 303.
153. Id.
154. Lousin, supra note 29, at 604. Private associations in particular also changed
their rules to avoid sex discrimination challenges under the new constitution. Id. at 601.
155. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-101 (2008).
156. Roy G. Davis & Patrick A. Murphey, The Illinois Human Rights Act: Revision
of Illinois Law Concerning Discrimination in Employment, 69 ILL. B. J. 218, 218 (1980).
157. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (2008).
158. Id. at 5/1-102(F).
159. Id. at 5/1-102(A) (noting that higher education was added effective January 1,
1984).
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The Act grants greater protections than those granted by sections 17, 18,
and 19, by including national origin, age, marital status, military status,
sexual orientation, and unfavorable military discharge. 60 The Act also ex-
ceeds constitutional equality by including access to financial credit and
public accommodations.'
6 1
Further, the HRA seemingly extends the protections of sections 17 and
19. Those provisions only recognize freedom from discrimination in "the
hiring and promotion practices of any employer."'162 Under the HRA, civil
rights violations include an employer's refusal, "to hire, to segregate, or to
act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment,
selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or
terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of unlawful dis-
crimination or citizenship status.'
16 3
Despite its seeming intent to protect "all individuals" from employ-
ment discrimination, because the definition section deems an "employee" to
be "any individual performing services for remuneration within this State
for an employer,"'164 the HRA does not protect "individuals employed by
persons who are not 'employers' as defined" by the Act. 65 The Act defines
an "employer" as "any person employing fifteen or more employees within
Illinois during twenty or more calendar weeks within the calendar year.
'' 66
So, persons employed by employers having fewer than fifteen employees
are not covered, meaning all people are not protected from employment
160. Id. Unfavorable military discharge was added in 1993. Act of August 4, 1993,
Pub. Act 88-178, 1993 Ill. Laws 2153. Sexual orientation was added in 2006. Act of Jan 21,
2005, Pub. Act 93-1078, 2004 Ill. Laws 4837.
161. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (2008).
162. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 19.
163. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-102(A) (2008). The delegates to the constitutional
convention apparently understood the language of "hiring and promotion practices" to in-
clude the broader category of employment practices. Indeed, throughout the debates, em-
poyment discrimination was discussed in reference to section 17. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 50, at 1596.
164. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-10 l(A)(l)(a).
165. Id. at 5/2-101(A)(2)(b).
166. Id. at 5/2-101(B)(l)(a). The fifteen-person requirement in Illinois does not apply
"when a complainant alleges civil rights violations due to ... physical or mental handicap,"
id. at 5/2-101(B)(l)(b), nor does it apply to the "[s]tate and any political subdivision, mu-
nicipal corporation or other governmental unit or agency," id. at 5/2-101(B)(1)(c). Federal
laws barring similar forms of employment discrimination are now also limited to employers
with at least fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000). At times, however, the relevant
employee numbers had been one hundred, fifty, and twenty-five. Act of March 24, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). These numbers, unlike the fifteen in Illinois, were
founded on Congressional desires to meet the Federal Constitution's Commerce Clause
requirements (so as to avoid substantially regulating intrastate commerce). See Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964); see also United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 n.6 (1979).
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discrimination even though the HRA is generally intended to protect "all
individuals" and even though article I, section 17 recognizes rights in em-
ployment discrimination extending to "all persons." While smaller employ-
ers are not responsible under the HRA for all "unlawful discrimination" by
their employees, they are responsible for certain "sexual harassment" by
those same employees. 1
67
The intent of the HRA is to "secure and guarantee the rights estab-
lished" by section 18,168 which declares that "equal protection of the laws
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its units of
local government and school districts."' 169 Furthermore, the HRA is in-
tended to "promote the public health, welfare[,] and safety by protecting the
interest of all people in Illinois in maintaining personal dignity, in realizing
their full productive capacities and in furthering their interests, rights and
privileges as citizens."' 7° Unfortunately (and unconstitutionally we be-
lieve),' 71 the HRA falls short in promoting section 18 policies as it ex-
pressly seeks to "prevent . . . sexual harassment in higher education."
' 172
Thus, the HRA covers only students connected to "an institution of higher
education."'
173
Most individuals who are protected by the HRA are required to adhere
to strict procedures when they pursue equality claims. 174 Effective January,
2008, those procedures were significantly altered, as claimants must no
167. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(1)(b) (2008) (defining "employer" to include
"any person employing one or more employees" when a complainant alleges "sexual har-
assment"); id. at 5/2-102(D) (stating that an "employer" is only responsible for sexual har-
assment by non-employees and non-managerial and non-supervisory employees where the
employer knows of conduct and "fails to take reasonable corrective measures"); see also
Sangamon County Sheriff's Dep't v. 11. Human Rights Comm'n, 875 N.E.2d 10, 20-21 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007), review granted, 882 N.E.2d 83 (Ill. 2008) (identifying HRA managerial or
supervisory employees whose acts prompt strict liability of employers for sexual harass-
ment).
168. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(F) (2008).
169. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18.
170. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(E) (2008).
171. We limit our analyses to sections 17, 18, and 19 and thus do not consider
whether the general equal protection guarantee of section 2 invalidates certain HRA classifi-
cations. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that sexual orien-
tation is a suspect class under the state constitutional general equal protection provision and
the statutory ban on same-sex marriages falls under it as there is no compelling governmen-
tal interest).
172. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(B) (2008).
173. Id at 5/5A-101(C).
174. Id. at 5/7A-102. Discussion of the validity of the exclusive administrative rem-
edy for violation of constitutional rights is beyond the scope of this article. Id. at 5/8-11 (C).
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longer pursue fully their viable HRA claims within an agency. Rather, they
175can eventually go to the circuit courts, thereby procuring trials by jury.
VI. JUDICIAL FAILURES TO PROMOTE EQUALITY SINCE 1970
Following adoption of the 1970 constitution but before the enactment
of the HRA, some Illinois courts resolved equality claims on a case-by-case
basis. 176 Following the Act, however, judges now mostly defer to the Gen-
eral Assembly. In some instances, this deference is consistent with the ex-
press directions of the constitutional drafters and the voters.1 77 But else-
where, there are disturbing inconsistencies.
A. DECISIONS BEFORE THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
In 1974, the Illinois Supreme Court in Illinois v. Ellis construed the
section 18 guarantees of equal protection. 178 At issue was the constitutional
validity of the differing treatment of males and females under the Juvenile
Court Act 179 which then prohibited criminal prosecution of males under 17
and females under 18. Seventeen-year-old Delbert Ellis was convicted and
sentenced to prison for forgery and burglary.' 80 Ellis argued that the statute
violated the equal protection guarantees of section 18. The appellate court
agreed.'8' Upon appeal by the State, the high court held that the effect of
the statute's unconstitutionality was to require possible prosecutions of all
seventeen-year-olds, male and female, resulting in an affirmation of Ellis's
conviction. 182
The Ellis court reasoned that to properly construe similar, but distinct,
provisions within the constitution, the court must assume that each provi-
sion, and each separate clause, has significance. 83 Given the general equal
protection clauses in the Bill of Rights of both the Federal and Illinois Con-
stitutions, the court found that the section 18 drafters must have "intended
175. Id. at 5/7A-102 (dealing with employment discrimination); id. at 5/8B-102
(dealing with housing discrimination).
176. See, e.g., Illinois v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. 1974) (recognizing private causes
of action for unconstitutional discrimination).
177. McAffee, supra note 47, at 4.
178. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d at 99.
179. Id. at 99-101 (discussing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, 1 702-7(1) (1973), which had
been amended to cover all seventeen-year-olds effective January 1, 1973).
180. Id. at 99.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 102.
183. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d at 101 (citing Oak Park Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Viii. of
Oak Park, 296 N.E.2d 344, 347 (Ill. 1973)).
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to supplement and expand the guaranties" of those clauses. 84 Furthermore,
the court found the intent behind section 18 was to have courts apply the
highest level of judicial scrutiny to gender classifications despite the fact
that neither it nor the United States Supreme Court had done so in the past
under the general equal protection provisions.
185
An Illinois appellate court likewise construed section 17 broadly in
1978 in Walinski v. Morrison & Morrison.18 6 As in Ellis, the Walinski court
looked to the intent of the constitutional drafters as evidenced in the con-
vention debates.187 Specifically, the court found the self-execution clause in
section 17 revealed an intent for plaintiffs to have "compensatory and puni-
tive damages" for violations of section 17.188 Nancy Walinski had alleged
the defendant, a private employer, would not consider her for employment
because of her gender.189 Her complaint seeking monetary damages for sex
discrimination in hiring was dismissed by the trial court because section 17
did not include a damages remedy. 90 The appellate court reversed, finding
an intent by the drafters to allow "existing judicial or legislative remedies,"
including damages.191 It distinguished Teale v. Sears, Roebuck & Company,
a 1976 Illinois Supreme Court decision finding the Age Discrimination Act
precluded Illinois courts from expanding remedies beyond the "statutory
sanction.' ' 192 In Walinski, there was no statutory language setting limits on




In contrast to Ellis and Walinski, in Davis v. Attic Club, an Illinois ap-
pellate court foreshadowed what was to come under the Illinois Human
Rights Act as well as the "reasonable exemptions" clause of section 17.194
Plaintiffs (including females and one male) alleged that the Attic Club
(among others) discriminated against females by requiring that they be
served alcohol and lunch only in private rooms reserved far in advance,
184. Id.
185. Id. The court cited Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), where a plu-
rality of the U.S. Supreme Court would have found sex to be a suspect classification requir-
ing strict scrutiny under the Federal Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. Three justices in
Frontiero, however, deferred making that determination because the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment to the Federal Constitution was pending. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d at 101.
186. 377 N.E.2d 242 (I11. App. Ct. 1978).
187. Id. at 244 (looking to intent when "faced with a constitutional provision whose
meaning is thought to be uncertain").
188. Id. at 244-45 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, 881(c) (1975)).
189. Id. at 243.
190. Id.
191. Walinski, 377 N.E.2d at 244-45.
192. Id. at 245.
193. Id. As well in Walinski, but not Teale, there were discriminatory acts specifi-
cally barred by section 17, which also contains a self-execution clause. Id.
194. Davis v. Attic Club, 371 N.E.2d 903, 909 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
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while males did not face similar restrictions. 95 The complaint alleged that
this gender-based restriction violated the section 17 prohibition on dis-
crimination in the sale of property. 96 The Davis court held that voluntary
associations, such as private clubs, were exempt from section 17 prohibi-
tions. 97 The court construed the Illinois Liquor Control Act, in particular its
sections on discrimination' 98 and definitions, as exempting private clubs.'
99
This statutory exemption was then held not to violate the section 17 bar on
discrimination in the sale of property since its drafters "chose not to inter-
fere" with voluntary associations.2 °°
Davis was strongly criticized by Elmer Gertz in his 1978 assessment
of the effects of section 17 .20' As the chairman of the Bill of Rights Com-
mittee at the 1968 Illinois Constitutional Convention,20 2 Gertz had firsthand
knowledge of the constitutional debates. He disagreed that the drafters in-
tended an exemption for private clubs.20 3 Citing language of the delegates at
the debates regarding the reasonableness of private clubs discriminating by
supplying housing for members only, the Davis court extrapolated that dis-
crimination by private clubs, in general, was considered a reasonable ex-
emption. 04 Noting that this extrapolation was "tenuous, 20 5 Gertz argued
that even if a private club could be a reasonable exemption contemplated by
the drafters, it was not a reasonable exemption created by the legislature
under section 17.206 The language of section 17 was said to be forward-
looking as it declares that the General Assembly may enact reasonable ex-
20720emptions. The Illinois Liquor Control Act, enacted in 1949,208 was
195. Id. at 904. The male plaintiff was a Chicago attorney who complained that this
discrimination resulted in his inability to entertain female associates and clients, inhibiting
his business. Id.
196. Id. at 905 (alleging that the discrimination violated the Illinois Liquor Control
Act).
197. Id. at 912.
198. Id. at 905 (barring denials of "equal enjoyment" of premises where alcohol is
sold (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, 133 (1973))).
199. Davis, 371 N.E.2d at 909.
200. Id. at 911-12 (referencing 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention proceedings
recognizing other civil rights statutes that exempted truly private clubs). The dissent, how-
ever, had a different view. Id. at 916 (Simon, J., dissenting) ("The clear and simple words of
the discrimination prohibition should not be obscured by the less precise statements of
committees and delegates regarding provisions not adopted by the convention").
201. Gertz, supra note 30, at 313.
202. Id. at 287.
203. Id. at 312. He also disagreed that the Liquor Control Act itself supported such
an inference of an exemption for private clubs. Id. at 307-09.
204. Davis, 371 N.E.2d at 912.
205. Gertz, supra note 30, at 312.
206. Id. at 313.
207. Id.
208. Lousin, supra note 29, at 601.
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deemed by the court in Davis to have been effectively ratified by the draft-
ers.1°9 Gertz disagreed, finding the Liquor Control Act conflicted with the
"futurity" requirement of section 17./l°
B. DECISIONS AFTER THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS ACT
The Illinois Human Rights Act implemented in a single scheme the
specific equal protection and anti-discrimination principles within sections
17, 18, and 19. Unfortunately, within the HRA there is little recognition of
the differences between constitutional rights with and without self-
execution clauses or between constitutional rights with and without a rec-
ognized and limited role for the General Assembly. The courts have also
failed to differentiate, leaving unfulfilled the equality promises of 1970.
1. Section 17 Cases
The early section 17 cases demonstrate some disagreement over the
impact of the HRA. In 1982, the Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth
District, in Greenholdt v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., narrowly construed
the phrase "hiring and promotion practices. 21' Greenholdt had brought a
discrimination claim solely under section 17,212 alleging sex discrimination
when he lost his job due to his refusal to accept a transfer. Males were re-
quired to accept transfers while females could decline.213 The Greenholdt
court found that the plain language of section 17 was limited to hiring and
promotion practices.214 Since Greenholdt's transfer was lateral, it did not
involve a promotion practice despite its nexus to promotion, since transfer
would have put Greenholdt in line for a promotion.21 5
Agreeing with Greenholdt, in 1983 the Illinois Appellate Court for the
First District, in Thakkar v. Wilson Enterprises, Inc., also narrowly con-
strued "hiring and promotion practices" by excluding terminations and dis-
charges.216 The Thakkar court, however, also considered plaintiffs allega-
tions under the HRA217 as plaintiff argued he was fired due to his East In-
209. Gertz, supra note 30, at 313.
210. Id.; see also Davis, 371 N.E.2d at 916 n.4 (Simon, J., dissenting) (stating a
"statute passed long prior to the adoption of the Constitution cannot realistically be regarded
as providing an exemption from constitutional prohibitions," especially as the new Bill of
Rights provisions are "only prospective").
211. 438 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
212. Id. at 247.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 248.
215. Id. at 249.
216. 458 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
217. Id. at 986.
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dian ancestry.21 8 On this point the court rejected the plaintiffs argument
that "section 17 constitutes a second or alternative avenue to redress an
employment discrimination dispute. '219 Relying on precedents requiring
exhaustion of administrative remedies under FEPA, the court reasoned that
plaintiffs must also exhaust administrative remedies for claims under the
220 2new HRA, 0 including section 17 claims.2 '
The Thakkar court did not speak to the plain language of section 17,
which only authorizes the General Assembly to create "additional reme-
dies. 222 This language supported the plaintiffs argument that section 17
provides alternate (or supplemental) remedies to those within the HRA.223
The court focused on the HRA language that "except as otherwise provided
by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an
alleged civil rights violation., 224 If the intent of the legislature was, in fact,
to include all alleged constitutional violations, whether or not addressed in
the HRA, the court did not question whether the legislature had the author-
ity to omit from the statutory scheme certain discriminatory acts under sec-
tion 17. Of course, the legislature may have intended to speak only to those
violations that were expressly addressed in the statute. Finding such intent
would avoid constitutional problems, as the General Assembly can create
"additional remedies" but seemingly has no power to eliminate the constitu-
tional remedies arising directly under section 17, that is, to impair by legis-
lative enactment a "constitutional guarantee" under a Wanless analysis.225
Thakkar had a section 17 claim, as that provision bars discrimination based
on "national ancestry.' 226
The language of section 17 was construed more broadly by the Illinois
Appellate Court for the Fifth District in 1988 in Ritzheimer v. Insurance
Counselors, Inc.227 There, the plaintiff, Janelle Ritzheimer, was discharged
from employment due to pregnancy.228 While the court seemingly agreed
218. Id.
219. Id. at 987.
220. Id.
221. Thakkar, 458 N.E.2d at 989. But see Gertz, supra note 30, at 303 (noting that
one purpose of section 17 was to alleviate the ineffectiveness of FEPA).
222. Thakkar, 458 N.E.2d at 987 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, $ 1-101 (1981)).
223. Id. at 988 (noting the plaintiff's argument that "FEPA and the HRA are inde-
pendent remedies for violations of the rights guaranteed by section 17").
224. Id. at 987 (stating that the General Assembly intended HRA "to be the preemp-
tive vehicle for the resolution of employment discrimination cases in Illinois" (citing Ill.
Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 8-111 (D) (1981))).
225. Dep't of Pub. Works & Bldgs. v. Gorbe, 98 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ill. 1951).
226. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
227. 527 N.E.2d 1281, 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988), overruled by Baker v. Miller, 636
N.E.2d 551 (Il. 1994).
228. Id. at 1282.
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with Greenholdt that section 17 "hiring and promotion practices" do not
cover all employment practices, 229 the court found it did include termination
practices. 230 It used two reasons: the language of the provision itself 31 and
the intent of the drafters.232 It determined that "the common understanding
of the citizens, who by ratifying the constitution, gave it life," equates "hir-
ing practices" with "the state of being hired., 233 As "the state of being
hired" necessarily ends upon termination, termination practices were part of
"hiring practices. 234
Upon concluding that discriminatory termination was included within
section 17, the court addressed whether Janelle could present a private civil
action without first exhausting administrative remedies under the HRA.235
The court observed that judges have "uniformly recognized that where the
Act applies, it is the exclusive source for redress of alleged civil rights vio-
lations., 236 To avoid leaving Janelle, who had no claim under the HRA,
with no remedy, the court found the HRA did not apply. 7 Although the
Act asserts that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the sub-
ject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act,
', 238
it also defines civil rights violations as undertaken by "employers, 239 de-
fined to include "any person 'employing 15 or more employees within Illi-
nois during 20 or more calendar weeks within the calendar year of or pre-
ceding the alleged violation.' 240 As the defendant here employed less than
fifteen persons, the court found Janelle Ritzheimer to be outside the HRA
and thus with a viable circuit court action.241 The court concluded that
229. Id. at 1284.
230. Id. (disagreeing with the Thakkar decision).
231. Ritzheimer, 527 N.E.2d at 1285. The court also found that "the purpose of sec-
tion 17 [was] to provide for equality of employment opportunity and upgrading based on
merit," which necessitated the inclusion of termination and demotion practices. Id.
232. Id. at 1285-86 (noting that because the phrase "hiring and promotion practices"
is "ambiguous," the "meaning which the delegates ...attached to that provision before
sending it to the voters for ratification is relevant").
233. Id. at 1285.
234. Id. The Ritzheimer court also noted that when Constitutional Convention Dele-
gate Wilson was directly questioned at the debates about whether section 17 included "sepa-
ration, layoffs, et cetera," he responded affirmatively. Id. at 1286. This statement is in har-
mony with the proceedings in general. Though the language of section 17 specifically ad-
dresses "hiring and promotion practices," the delegates consistently referred to section 17 as
prohibiting employment discrimination. 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1592, 1595.
235. Ritzheimer, 527 N.E.2d at 1286.
236. Id. (citing Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ill. 1985)).
237. Id. at 1287.
238. Id. at 1286 (citing 11. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 8-111(C) (1985)).
239. Id. at 1286-87 (citing I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 2-102(A) (1985)).
240. Ritzheimer, 527 N.E.2d at 1287 (citing I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 2-101(B)(1)(a)
(1985)).
241. Id. at 1288.
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rather than "excuse any class of employers from ... obligations under Arti-
cle I, section 17 ... what the Act does instead is simply to impose greater
restrictions on and provide additional remedies for claims of discrimination
against employers of a certain size. 242
Unfortunately, in 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Baker v. Miller,
expressly rejected the approach in Ritzheimer.243 Plaintiff, Cathy Baker,
was found exempted from coverage under the HRA because her employer
had less than fifteen employees. 2" Cathy filed a complaint directly in a
circuit court, alleging that she was terminated because of her gender in vio-
lation of section 17.245
To reach its conclusion, the court analyzed both section 17 and the
HRA.246 Noting that the plain language of section 17 granted the legislature
the authority to create "reasonable exemptions," the court turned to the his-
tory of the 1970 constitution to shed light on the scope of such exemp-
tions.247 Comments by Delegate Wilson, a member of the Bill of Rights
Committee at the constitutional convention, were referenced. Wilson had
described the "relationship" between an employer and employee as being
"personal" and "intimate" when there are small employers, allowing greater
"freedom of choice." 248 The court then held that fifteen was a reasonable
dividing point for a small employer exemption.249 The court did not refer-
ence Elmer Gertz, the Chair of the Bill of Rights Committee, who, a few
years after the convention, said that while FEPA precluded employers with
242. Id.
243. Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551, 558 (Ill. 1994).
244. Id. at 559 (noting that the HRA "implicitly exempts small employers," meaning
"employees of small employers are 'covered' under the Act" so they "[cannot] bring a direct
action under section 17").
245. Id. at 552-53. Incidentally, an unfortunate concession was made regarding the
section 17/HRA interplay. The Baker court noted that the parties had agreed that "where the
Act provides coverage, it is the exclusive remedy for employment discrimination." Id. at
554. It then cited Mein, a case involving age discrimination, clearly not covered by section
17. Id. (citing Mein v. Masonite Corp., 485 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ill. 1985)). In Baker, the sex
discrimination claim was covered by section 17. Id. Even the more sympathetic court in
Ritzheimer found HRA exclusivity. Ritzheimer, 527 N.E.2d at 1286 (citing Mein, 485
N.E.2d at 315)). Yet, such exclusivity forecloses, for example, a finding that the HRA sim-
ply provides, as section 17 invites, "additional remedies" that supplement (and do not super-
sede) the section 17 remedies already available through independent lawsuits. See ILL.
CONST. art. I, § 17. For whatever reason(s), the Illinois General Assembly is expressly
granted far less discretion regarding the parameters of section 17 claims than section 18 or
section 19 claims. See id. § 17-19. With age discrimination claims outside explicit Illinois
constitutional protection, statutory remedies are also subject to even broader legislative
discretion.
246. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 554.
247. Id. at 555.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 556.
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less than twenty-five employees, "the employment of ten, fifteen, or twenty
people certainly does not necessarily constitute the relationship 'of a highly
personal nature' entitled to exemption under the new constitution.',
250
The intent of the conventioneers to allow limited statutory exemptions
for only some small employers, recognized by Chair Gertz, is reflected in
some of the very same convention materials quoted by the court in Baker.
Delegate Wilson, for example, said there may be "situations" where there is
"greater value" in "a freedom of choice" on the part of a "small" employer
who has "an intimate and personal" relationship with employees.25 1 He
never said, nor implied, that every small employer had such a relationship.
Wilson did recognize, however, that such a relationship would allow a
statutory exemption from equality dictates for "religious organizations"
wishing "to employ ...members of their own faith only., 252 A Bill of
Rights Committee report during the constitutional convention, quoted in
Baker, also spoke to the limits of the new anti-discrimination initiatives. It
said "few would approve an anti-discrimination provision that absolutely
prohibited the kind of indirect discrimination involved in providing housing
exclusively to the aged members of certain religious or ethnic organiza-
tions, or women's groups," as here "relationships that are on so small a
scale and ... so intimate that they are of a highly personal nature. 253 Pre-
sumably, other exempted small employers would have to share at least
some of the attributes of religious, ethnic, or women's organizations. As
well, as noted in the HRA debates quoted in Baker, "private clubs" were
254joined with "religious corporations" in HRA exemptions.
Would Delegate Wilson (as Chair Gertz would not) condone a law ex-
empting a for-profit tavern business from having to maintain gender equal-
ity in its employment practices? Here, Wilson and Gertz likely are on the
same page, though different from the court in Baker. Incidentally, as to the
fifteen and under rule of the HRA, a possible origin is the statutory limit in
federal civil rights laws deeming private employers and other private actors
responsible for equality. 255 These laws are founded on, and limited by, the
Commerce Clause power of Congress. Such commerce concerns (beyond
250. Gertz, supra note 30, at 302.
251. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 555.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 557-58.
254. Id. at 556-57.
255. See, e.g., Act of March 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000)) (stating that an employer "engaged in any
industry affecting commerce" is defined by employment of fifteen or more employees); H.R.
REP. No. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155 (noting, while recog-
nizing Commerce Clause constraints on Congress, "discrimination in employment is con-
trary to the national policy and equally invidious whether practiced by small or large em-
ployers").
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federal preemption) should be immaterial to Illinois lawmakers. The fifteen
and under rule for all employers in Illinois is overbroad if, in fact, it is in-
tended to protect religious, ethnic, or women's entities or wholly private
clubs. Even if there is some reason to treat small employers somewhat dif-
ferently from large employers under the HRA, such preferential treatment
should not be extended across the board. Blanket immunity from all equal-
ity claims, for us, is unwarranted, at least in intentional or otherwise egre-
gious misconduct settings256 as well as settings where only equitable relief
is sought.
The court in Baker rejected plaintiff's argument that the self-execution
clause of section 17 provided her with a private right of action.2 17 The self-
execution clause says section 17 "rights are enforceable without action by
the General Assembly. ''258 Relying on comments from the constitutional
convention, the court found that this clause was intended to recognize a
cause of action only if the legislature had done nothing. 9 In construing the
HRA, the court determined that the General Assembly intended to imple-
ment fully section 17.260 So, the legislature did something, and not nothing,
by excluding certain people with constitutional claims of inequality.26'
The court in Baker also relied on the rule of statutory construction that
courts presume that the General Assembly did not intend "absurdity, incon-
venience or injustice. 262 It said its holding was necessary to avoid injustice.
It found the HRA reflects a balancing between the interests of employees
suffering discrimination and the interests of employers who might be sub-
jected to frivolous charges.263 The court found that the HRA drafters, in
allowing a small employer exemption, clearly anticipated that some em-
256. Eliminating blanket immunity for employers of less than fifteen employees
would extend significant civil rights protections. In 2005 in Illinois, there were 318,927
"establishments" with employees: 175,466 had one to four employees; 58,109 had five to
nine employees; and 39,674 had ten to nineteen employees. U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.censusbureau.biz/epcd/susb/2005/ilIL--.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2008).
257. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 558.
258. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
259. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 558 ("[T]he self-executing provision does not operate
where the General Assembly has acted.").
260. Id. at 556 (providing that the Act is intended to secure and guarantee the rights
established by sections 17, 18, and 19).
261. A limitation on common law suits by a special statutory scheme is similar to,
but different in ways from, barriers to all suits under a general statute. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v.
Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009) (finding that the comprehensive Title IX
remedial scheme within 1972 Education Amendments is not an exclusive means of vindicat-
ing certain federal constitutional equality rights, thereby precluding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits).
262. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 557 (citing Harris v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 489 N.E.2d
1374, 1379 (Ill. 1986)).
263. Id.
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ployees (of small employers) would be left without a remedy.26 It reasoned
that if these exempted employees could sue in court, the HRA would create
injustice by leaving small employers to defend costly private suits while
protecting large employers from similar suits. 265 As well, the HRA limits
punitive damages. 66 If small employers could be sued in courts under sec-
tion 17, they would be vulnerable to such damages, while larger employers
would not.267 Finally, the HRA would protect larger employers through the
demand that claims be filed, in the agency, within 180 days, while small
employers suable in court would be subject to litigation for up to five
268years.
Had the Baker court assessed differently the HRA exemption of small
employers, there would have been no need to address the issues of inde-
pendent section 17 lawsuits and of avoiding injustices between large and
small employers. Neither the constitutional nor the statutory histories actu-
ally referenced in the Baker opinion support exempting all small employers,
and all their employees, from section 17 equality. The court in Baker should
have explored better whether the exemption of all small employers under
the HRA was reasonable.269 We find it unreasonable.
264. Id. at 555.
265. Id. at 557.
266. Id.
267. See Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 557.
268. Id. This approach is not always followed where small employers are exempted
from special statutory remedy provisions. See, e.g., Thurdin v. SEI Boston, LLC, 895 N.E.2d
446, 459 (Mass. 2008) (noting that a plaintiff, who could not sue employer for gender and
pregnancy discrimination under state's general anti-discrimination law, could sue under
state's equal rights statute); Maggart v. Almany Realtors, Inc., 259 S.W.3d 700, 703 (Tenn.
2008) (noting that as workers' compensation law exempted smaller-less than five employ-
ees-companies, these companies could be sued in trial courts for their employees' personal
injuries arising from accidents).
269. We urge Illinois courts to better recognize the differences between exemptions
in constitutional settings and in purely statutory claim settings. We are skeptical of wholly
exempting all small employees from section 17 inequality claims. We recognize there are
differences when the unreasonableness of a fifteen-employee rule for equality claims arises
wholly under legislation, i.e., acts unguided by specific constitutional mandates for equality.
See Jarod S. Gonzalez, State Anti-Discrimination Statutes and Implied Preemption of Com-
mon Law Torts: Valuing the Common Law, 59 S.C. L. REv. 115 (2007) (examining when
state statutes can preempt state common law torts in employment settings, as with provisions
requiring fifteen or more employers). In the constitutional setting, we can imagine reason-
ableness in differences in damages for constitutional inequalities between some larger and
smaller employers, though comparable differences in available equitable remedies may not
be sustainable. Our thoughts on reasonableness are tentative, at best, though the broad ban
on any remedies for all those suffering discrimination at the hands of small employers is
unreasonable, especially given Elmer Gertz's observations, Gertz, supra note 30, and the
constitutional language within section 17, ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
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In allowing an unreasonable HRA exemption, the Baker court effec-
tively invites injustice for many with valid constitutional claims. Illinois
law has remained unchanged since Baker. The Illinois HRA still ostensibly
provides the exclusive avenue for relief for those experiencing unconstitu-
tional inequality.27° Of course, some succeed under the Act.27' Unfortu-
nately, there are many plaintiffs, like Cathy Baker, left remediless, often
failing to press their constitutional claims in courts, perhaps because that
would "invite sanctions for filing frivolous pleadings., 272 This approach to
section 17 inequality is contrary to the approach to section 6 invasions in
Amati v. City of Woodstock, where the court recognized there would be a
section 12 "right to remedy" claim for a section 6 invasion in the absence of
"a comprehensive civil damage scheme including actual and punitive dam-
ages. 273
Exclusivity of the HRA extends beyond equality claims. For example,
some who have causes of action separate from the constitution and from the
HRA can be left without an initial judicial remedy due to the HRA.274 Mel-
ody Geise, one such person, brought "common law tort" claims in a circuit
court against both a former co-worker and an employer based on sexual
harassment by the co-worker. 275 The complaint alleged that the co-worker
caused her termination when she reported his conduct to the employer. 76
Melody's complaint included two counts against the employer, one for neg-
ligent employee retention and one for negligent employee hiring.277 On
270. Baker, 636 N.E.2d at 559 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 8-111(C) (1991) (stat-
ing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no court of this state shall have jurisdiction
over the subject of an alleged civil fights violation other than as set forth in" the HRA (cur-
rent version at 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-111 (C) (2008))).
271. Mary Lee Leahy, The Hope for Equal Protection Under the Law For Women
Realized in Illinois, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 287, 291-95 (1997) (discussing four cases in which
female complainants were granted relief through the administrative remedies of the Act).
272. Lousin, supra note 29, at 602.
273. 829 F. Supp. 998, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1993). While section 17 does expressly allow
for "reasonable exemptions" covering certain section 17 claimants, we do not find the ex-
emption of all small employers to be reasonable given the constitutional drafters' intentions
that "all persons" have "the fight to be free from discrimination," and their discussions dur-
ing debates about exempting employees with truly intimate relations with their employers. 3
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1593.
274. The courts were apparently willing to interpret the provision's mandate that "no
court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation"
to include common law tort claims. 775 ILL. CONP. STAT. 5/8-111 (C) (2008). Since the Act
purports to implement the anti-discrimination provisions of, inter alia, section 17, this is a
stretch indeed. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(F) (2008).
275. Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chi., Inc., 639 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (Ill. 1994).
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1274-75 (noting that the first two counts involved the co-worker and were
not at issue on appeal).
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appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, these claims were dismissed based on
HRA exclusivity. 78
Though pleaded as common law claims, the court found that this did
"not alter the fundamental nature of her cause of action" 279 against the em-
ployer. This fundamental nature involved sexual harassment allegations
against a co-worker.28 ° In particular, the court held that these claims against
the employer were "inextricably linked" to sexual harassment, a civil rights
violation under the Act.281 Since "Geise would have no independent basis
for imposing liability on her former employer" without alleging sexual har-
assment,282 the court held that her claims were precluded by HRA exclusiv-
ity.283 Consequently, Melody Geise was left in the same position as Cathy
Baker-without an initial remedy in a trial court. Now, not only are many
claimants not covered or exempted by the HRA left without recourse for
inequality,284 but also many claimants with valid common law torts are de-
nied an initial trial court forum because their claims are inextricably linked
to the HRA.285 Melody was denied her common law claims even though
section 17 expressly says the General Assembly may only "provide addi-
tional remedies" for section 17 violations.286
278. Id. at 1278.
279. Id. at 1277.
280. Geise, 639 N.E.2d at 1277.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 1278 (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 69, 1 8-111(C) (1989) (current version at
775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-111(C) (2008))). Incidentally, inextricable linkage analyses can
operate in other settings and, on occasion, aid civil rights claimants. See, e.g., Thompson v.
N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 prohibits "employers from taking retaliatory action against employees
not directly involved in protected activity, but who are so closely related to or associated
with those who are directly involved, that it is clear that the protected activity motivated the
employer's actions"; here, the employee was fired after his fianc6e filed a gender discrimina-
tion charge against the same employer).
284. See Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551, 559 (Ill. 1994).
285. See Geise, 639 N.E.2d at 1277-78. Examples of common law torts that are not
inextricably linked to the HRA have been found. See, e.g., Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co.,
444 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing intentional infliction of emotional distress); Spahn
v. Int'l Quality & Productivity Ctr., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (N.D. I11. 2002) (discussing inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress); Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2009) (discussing
retaliatory discharge); Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 687 N.E.2d 21, 23 n.2 (Ill. 1997) (recogniz-
ing that a plaintiff advancing with an HRA claim, along with independent intentional tort
claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment, have "but one satisfaction"). Inextricable
linkage has also been found. See, e.g., Doe v. La Magdalena II, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 984
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (discussing claims for assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
286. Preclusion of a general statutory remedy when there is a special statutory reme-
dial scheme is far different than finding that a special statutory scheme preempts a constitu-
tional remedy. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 129 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2009)
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The exclusivity approaches to the HRA run contrary, at least in a gen-
eral way that goes unexplained, to the non-exclusivity allowed under simi-
lar provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA), expressly recog-
nized in Geise. The employer in Geise attempted to urge Melody's claims
against it were "barred by the exclusivity provision" of the WCA.287 "With-
out intimating any view as to the merits," the court found the WCA exclu-
sivity was "in the nature of a waivable affirmative defense" which the em-
ployer had waived.288 The Geise court looked to Doyle v. Rhodes, where it
held that WCA exclusivity was waivable, as when the employer hopes the
"common law negligence claim" will go unproven, allowing the employer
"to escape liability completely." 289 By contrast, relying on the precedent in
Mein v. Masonite, the Geise court noted HRA exclusivity was jurisdictional
and thus nonwaivable. 290 However, in Mein, the exclusive jurisdiction rul-
ing was rendered in a case that did not involve an equality claim recognized
in the Illinois Constitution, as only age discrimination was involved. Of
course, Melody Geise had a constitutional equality claim under a provision
which barred sex discrimination and which did recognize "additional reme-
dies" for the constitutional violations could arise by statute. She did not
simply have a common law or statutory right arising independently from
any constitutional right. Under a Doyle, and not a Mein, approach, Melody
could have chosen with her employer to go straight to court with her com-
mon law claims (if not her joined section 17 claims), waiving the jurisdic-
tional opportunities afforded by the HRA (as they are at best only "addi-
tional remedies" under section 17).291
(noting that Title IX does not preempt suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as it does not provide the
exclusive means of vindicating gender discrimination claims against federally funded educa-
tional institutions).
287. Geise, 639 N.E.2d at 1275 ("No common law or statutory right to recover dam-
ages from the employer, for injury... sustained by any employee while engaged in the
line of his duty as such employee, other than the compensation herein provided, is available
to any employee who is covered by... this Act .... (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, 1 138.5(a)
(1989) (current version at 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 305/5(a) (2008)))).
288. Id. at 1275-76 (noting there was no "legal impediment" to a timely assertion and
the untimeliness did not result from "inadvertent blunder").
289. Id. at 1276 (noting that nothing in the record suggests the waiver by Melody's
employer was not "deliberate").
290. Id.
291. The 2008 amendments to the HRA now allow a claimant to pursue a trial court
action de novo, but only after first complying with HRA grievance procedures. See 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/7A-102(A), (A-1), (D)(2)-(3) (2008) (noting charges under HRA articles 2, 4,
5, 5a, and 6); 775 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/7B-102(A), (F) (2008); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8B-
102(A) (2002) (noting charges under HRA article 3). We are not sure that they now allow
the Melody Geises of the world to pursue all common law as well as HRA claims. Even if
they do, the Geise ruling remains a good example of a judicial approach that does not ade-
quately take into account the differences between constitutional and purely statutory claims.
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2. Section 18 Cases
Under section 18, "equal protection" is not to be "denied or abridged
on account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school
districts." This section seemingly duplicates some of the protections in sec-
tion 17, which bans sex discrimination "in the hiring and promotion prac-
tices of any employer or in the sale or rental of property." Both speak to
inequalities based on sex in employment and housing. Yet section 18 goes
further by recognizing sex equality must be afforded by governments in
such matters as schooling, health care, and welfare benefits. However, sec-
tion 18 seemingly is also subject to greater General Assembly oversight
than section 17 as its equality provisions are not deemed, like section 17
rights, "enforceable without action by the General Assembly." As well,
statutes on section 18 rights,292 unlike section 17 rights, are not expressly
limited to "reasonable exemptions" and "additional remedies for violation."
One important, and very troubling, section 18 case is Teverbaugh ex
rel. Duncan v. Moore.293 There, a seventh grade student, Amy Teverbaugh,
and her mother sued a school district directly under section 18 for sex dis-
crimination by two male students. The appellate court held that any recov-
ery must come under the HRA294 and that the Act contained no cause of
action for damages to students arising from sex discrimination occurring in
primary or secondary schools, 295 though the HRA does prohibit "sexual
harassment" against students "in higher education ' '296 and sex discrimina-
tion against employees by any public school.297
In reaching its conclusion, the Teverbaugh court compared section 18
to section 17. In interpreting constitutions, much like statutes, it said that
292. We acknowledge that, even without express recognition of delegated power in
section 18, the equality demanded of school districts in section 18 seemingly is subject to
some General Assembly authority. Section 18 guarantees are certainly addressed in the HRA
and seemingly are authorized by the Illinois Constitution. See ILL. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("The
State shall provide for an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and
services.").
293. 724 N.E.2d 225 (I11. App. Ct. 2000).
294. Id. at 229-30 (stating that "it is incumbent upon the Illinois legislature to ac-
knowledge a right of action under the Human Rights Act" as, under Mein and Baker, the
HRA is the "comprehensive remedial scheme for enforcing civil rights under the Illinois
Constitution").
295. Id. at 230 ("[W]e are aware that the Human Rights Act does not expressly rec-
ognize a right of damages under the circumstances contemplated in this case.").
296. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(B) (2008); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5A-
101(E) (1984).
297. See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(1)(c) (1992) (noting that "employer"
includes governmental units); 775 ILL. COWP. STAT. 5/2-101(G) (1992) (noting that "public
employer" includes school districts); 775 ILL. COM. STAT. 5/2-102(A) (2008) (discussing
"unlawful discrimination" in employment by "any employer").
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courts must first look to the words used298 as they provide the best indica-
tion of legislative intent. 99 Additional bases for constitutional interpretation
appear, of course, in constitutional convention debates and in conduct sur-
rounding the "first legislative action" following the adoption of the consti-
tutional provision in issue.300 While section 17 states that "all persons shall
have the right to be free from discrimination" and that "these rights are en-
forceable without action by the General Assembly, '30 ' section 18 only says
"equal protection" shall not be denied.30 2 After comparing sections 17 and
18, and examining the afore described Baker ruling on section 17, the
Teverbaugh court found that the section 18 drafters did not intend an auto-
matic private right of action.30 3 It said that where the drafters use different
language, courts should usually presume different results were intended.30 4
Unfortunately, the Teverbaugh court did not compare section 18,
which says nothing of General Assembly responsibility, to constitutional
provisions outside of section 17. Thus, it did not look, for example, to the
very different language in section 8.1 of article I which expressly recog-
nizes General Assembly authority to provide "by law" the guidelines on
both the nature and the enforcement of a crime victim's "right to restitu-
tion." And, it did not consider section 15 of article I on eminent domain,
which the People ex rel. Wanless v. City of Chicago court found "self-
executing,, 30 5 even though there was no express language on self-
execution. In Wanless the court said that the eminent domain right could
not be impaired by legislative enactment.30 6 Finally, the Teverbaugh court
in 2000 did not look at any cases where the courts had spoken of a constitu-
tional provision as "hortatory," "merely an expression of philosophy and
not a mandate that a certain remedy be provided in any specific form.,
3 07
For us, section 18 is more comparable to section 15 on eminent domain
than to section 20 on individual dignity, as read in AIDA v. Time Warner
298. Teverbaugh, 724 N.E.2d at 229.
299. Id. ("The comparative texts of article I, section 17 and article I, section 18,
evidence that where the drafters intended to provide a right of action for damages for dis-
crimination, they purposefully included language to effect such a result in the absence of
implementing legislation.").
300. Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 142, Cook County v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737 (Ill.
1973).
301. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
302. Id. § 18.
303. Teverbaugh, 724 N.E.2d at 229.
304. Id.
305. People ex rel. Wanless v. City of Chi., 38 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. 1941).
306. Id. (discussing an earlier constitutional provision on eminent domain, appearing
in article II, section 13, of the Illinois Constitution).
307. See AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 772 N.E.2d 953, 960-61 (I11. App. Ct.
2002) (describing the promotion of "individual dignity" in article I, section 20, of the Illinois
Constitution).
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Entertainment Co.3°8 Interests "taken or damaged" under section 15 and
interests "denied or abridged" under section 18 are different from the inter-
ests in section 20 that are promoted by deeming certain communications
"condemned." The former seem more personal, more indicative of signifi-
cant concerns for those whose protected interests are denied. As well, sec-
tion 18 is unlike section 8.1 which expressly recognizes General Assembly
authority to limit the restitution right to certain people. Thus, we think the
court was wrong in Teverbaugh not to demand at least some protection for
younger school children, far less capable of protecting themselves from
inequalities than college students or adult employees.3 °9
3. Section 19 Cases
Under section 19, discrimination against all persons "with a physical
or mental handicap" is prohibited "in the sale or rental of property" and "in
the hiring and promotion practices of any employer" where the discrimina-
tion is "unrelated to ability."31 Section 19 is more like section 18 than sec-
tion 17, as it contains no express mention of self-execution or of General
Assembly responsibilities.
In Yount v. Hesston Corp. ,3  Lonnie Yount alleged that his private
employer terminated his employment because of his known "mental handi-
cap" for which he received treatment "with his employer's knowledge and
cooperation" and which "did not prevent him from performing his work
duties.3 2 As a result, Lonnie argued that he could proceed initially in an
Illinois circuit court "directly under" section 19.3 13 Relying on Thakkar,
albeit a section 17 case, the court in Yount found HRA exclusivity, 314 result-
ing in Lonnie's inability to sue. Those falling outside the HRA 3 15 were pre-
308. See id.
309. The Teverbaugh court determined that under the decision in Ellis, "an action
solely to challenge the constitutionality of classifications by the State" was contemplated
under section 18. Teverbaugh, 724 N.E.2d at 228. Such an action, however, seemingly runs
counter to the exclusivity analysis in Baker, as equitable relief is available under the HRA.
See, e.g., 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7A-104(A) (1990).
310. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
311. 464 N.E.2d 1214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
312. Id. at 1215-16.
313. Id. at 1216.
314. Id. at 1218. The Yount court also rejected Lonnie's argument that the court had
jurisdiction under article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution, which provides "a certain
remedy in law for each wrong suffered." Id. The court found that section 12 only operates
"whenever the legislature has failed to provide a remedy," and because the "the legislature
has provided a legal remedy" under the HRA, section 12 was inapplicable. Id.
315. While Lonnie Yount fell outside the HRA when he sued in court because he did
not earlier exhaust his administrative remedies, the rationale in Yount covers all who fall
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cluded from suing in trial courts as the HRA was "the preemptive vehicle
for the resolution of employment discrimination cases ' 316 and thus provided
"the exclusive remedy. 3 17 Fortunately, for those harmed by "unlawful dis-
crimination" in employment in the private sector based on "physical or
mental handicap unrelated to ability," all employers are included, and not
just those with fifteen or more employees.318 So, Lonnie lost only because
he did not first litigate under HRA procedures. Incidentally, it is curious to
us that small employers are immunized from HRA gender discrimination
claims by the likes of Cathy Baker, but not from HRA disability discrimina-
tion claims by the likes of Lonnie Yount.319
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PROMOTION OF EQUALITY
The Illinois General Assembly and the Illinois Supreme Court have
yet to meet the expectations of the drafters and the people regarding the
new equality provisions of the 1970 constitution. They should act now to
secure the equal protection and anti-discrimination guarantees intended in
1970.
"All persons" were, by the plain language of section 17, to be pro-
tected against discrimination in housing and employment. 320 The General
Assembly was authorized only to "establish reasonable exemptions" and to
"provide additional remedies." 321 Both the delegates and the voters antici-
pated that most who suffered such discrimination would have some re-
course.32 2 Elmer Gertz described General Assembly authority over section
17 remedies as follows: "It could not take away any remedy, nor undermine
the basic right., 323 Accordingly, to effectuate the guarantees of the 1970
constitution, the General Assembly should amend the HRA to recognize
more broadly causes of action for denials of equality in employment and
outside the HRA, whether by the procedural defaults of otherwise statutorily-recognized
claimants or through the lack of statutory coverage of those claiming harm. See id.
316. Yount, 464 N.E.2d at 1218 (citing Thakkar v. Wilson Enters., Inc., 458 N.E.2d
985, 881, 883 (II1. App. Ct. 1983) (dictum)).
317. Id.
318. Compare 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(l)(a) & (b) (1992), with 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(1)(c) (1992) (noting governmental employers are responsible
"without regard to the number of employees"), and 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-10 1(B)(1)(d)
& (e) (1992) (noting employers responsible "without regard to the number of employees" if
parties to public contracts or joint apprenticeship or training committees).
319. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(1)(b) (1992) (noting any employer is
subject to liability for "sexual harassment").
320. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 17.
321. Id.
322. See John Elmer, New Constitution Offers Something Old and New, CHI. TIB.,
Nov. 10, 1970, at 2.
323. GERTZ, supra note 25, at 102.
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housing.324 It is not uncommon for a North American legislature to override
by later statute an earlier judicial precedent that too narrowly implements
equality principles.325 The General Assembly should either expand the
types of claimants with section 17 claims under the HRA or recognize that
many not now statutorily covered (i.e., those improperly exempted from the
HRA) can pursue claims initially in the circuit courts.
In the absence of new legislation, the Illinois Supreme Court should
find that the General Assembly has impermissibly interfered with section
17 rights. The high court could adopt the Ritzheimer rationale that claimants
not covered by the Act, rather than being exempted, generally have re-
course through private causes of action. As "all persons" have section 17
rights, most employers and lessors (i.e., those not reasonably exempted)
should be generally responsible in some way for discriminatory acts. The
General Assembly could still maintain limited exemptions, as for those
affiliated with religious, ethnic, or women's organizations, or with private
clubs, as such exclusions are consistent with the intent of the convention
delegates that reasonable exemptions for truly intimate relationships are
permitted.326
Similarly, section 18 equality principles must be better recognized.
Denials and abridgments of equal protection on account of sex "by the State
or its units of local government and school districts" are barred by section
18, with no express indication that there is even room for "reasonable ex-
emptions," as there is in section 17. Amy Teverbaugh warrants some state
constitutional law protection against governments that refuse "to restrain..
repeated acts of sexual misconduct" 327 against females and that acquiesce
the sexual harassment of females.328 Section 18 demands are not simply
hortatory. Those who suffer governmental denials of equal protection on
account of sex should not be left, as suggested in Teverbaugh, to equity
lawsuits that "challenge the constitutionality of classifications by the
324. In particular, amendments are needed to expand the definition of "employees"
under 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-10 1(B)(1)(a) (1992).
325. See, e.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1957-58 (2008)
(demonstrating how Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981, granting "all persons" the same
rights regarding contracts as are enjoyed by "white citizens," to include conduct after con-
tract formation, including retaliation based on, for example, race, after the U.S. Supreme
Court had excluded such conduct from the scope of the earlier version of the same statute).
326. See 3 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 50, at 1593; see also 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
101(A)(2)(a) (1992) (noting domestic employees are exempted); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-
101(B)(2) (1992) (noting employers do not include religion-based entities); Rweyemamu v.
Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008) (recognizing defenses for a Roman Catholic Diocese to
federal Title VII claims for race discrimination in employment under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, though the defenses may be waived).
327. Teverbaugh ex rel. Duncan v. Moore, 724 N.E.2d 225, 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
328. See id. at 230.
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State, 329 assuming they even have such opportunities.3 30 Even if certain
exemptions from section 18 dictates were permitted, they should not permit
equality denials by such large groups as "primary and secondary
schools.",33 1 Rather, they should be narrowly tailored, like the religious,
ethnic or women's group or private club exemptions permitted under sec-
tion 17.
Section 19 commands that "[a]ll persons with a physical or mental
handicap shall be free from discrimination in the sale or rental of property
and shall be free from discrimination unrelated to ability in the hiring and
promotion practices of any employer. 3 32 Because section 19, like section
18, expressly articulates no role for the General Assembly, greater protec-
tions against unconstitutional discrimination must be available for people
"with a physical or mental handicap." As with section 18, any exemptions
should be narrowly drawn. Some narrower exemptions are already in play
since section 19 employers, unlike section 17 employers, are included with-
out regard to the number of employees.333 Yet what about claimants like
Lonnie Yount, who go to court first rather than to the Illinois Department of
Human Rights and thus lose their chance to complain about discrimination
because HRA deadlines were missed? Should we not generally allow toll-
ing of those HRA timing requirements, at least in cases where HRA exclu-
sivity was unclear and common law claims were timely filed in circuit
courts, as when common law and HRA claims may or may not reasonably
seem "inextricably" linked?
334
329. Id. at 228.
330. Given the exclusivity of the HRA for all who are covered, which include, under
the Baker court analysis, those who are exempted by the HRA, equity lawsuits under Illinois
section 18 equality principles may not even be available to the Amy Teverbaughs (and Cathy
Bakers) of the world. See Baker v. Miller, 636 N.E.2d 551, 559 (Ill. 1994) (noting exempted
employees are "covered" under the HRA though their employers are exempted). Federal
claims are certainly not preempted, per the federal constitutional Supremacy Clause, but the
mens rea requirements for claimants like Amy Teverbaugh under federal constitutional equal
protection make federal equity lawsuits difficult. See, e.g., Illinois v. R.L., 634 N.E.2d 733,
737-38 (Ill. 1994) (noting intent is needed for both federal and Illinois constitutional equal
protection claims).
331. Such schools have been held accountable elsewhere. See, e.g., L.W. ex rel. L.G.
v. Toms River Reg'l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 915 A.2d 535, 553 (N.J. 2007) (holding that the
school district is liable for student-on-student harassment when the district knew or should
have known of the harassment but failed to act to end the offensive conduct).
332. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 19.
333. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-101(B)(l)(b) (1992).
334. In Yount, as Lonnie was governed by article 2 of the HRA (employment), he
was required to file a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights "within 180 days
after the date that a civil rights violation allegedly has been committed." 775 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7A-102(A)(1) (2008). Had Lonnie filed in circuit court within 180 days, and had he
quite reasonably, but wrongly, believed he had a common law claim and no HRA claims that
were inextricably linked, there would have been no forgiveness for missing the HRA filing
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New equal protection and anti-discrimination initiatives in Illinois are
demanded by the 1970 amendments to the Illinois Constitution. They are
especially important where there is a failure/inability of federal lawmakers
to protect victims of inequality, including folks like Cathy Baker and Amy
Teverbaugh.335
VIII. CONCLUSION
Expectations of greater constitutional equality in Illinois have not been
met. Constitutional rights expressly recognized for "all" persons have been
legislatively and judicially applied to exempt many persons, often with no
legitimate rationale. Many victims of inequality have been forgotten. The
Illinois Human Rights Act improperly restricts many with just complaints
about inequalities in housing, employment, and other matters. The HRA,
for example, is too restrictive under section 17 in affording freedom from
discrimination in employment and housing and under section 18 in afford-
ing sexual equality protections against "the State and its units of local gov-
ernment and school districts." The Illinois Supreme Court has acquiesced in
unconstitutional inequalities by being too deferential to the General Assem-
bly. Illinois lawmakers must now alter both statutes and case precedents in
order to fulfill the legitimate expectations of greater constitutional equality.
As Elmer Gertz said thirty years ago: "The new constitutional provisions
are not dead letters. Nothing prevents their use. 33 6 Greater equality protec-
tions should now be afforded to Cathy Baker, Amy Teverbaugh, Lonnie
Yount and many others "covered" but "exempted" from the HRA.
deadline under the Yount court analysis or under the express language of the HRA. In fact,
Lonnie filed his claim with the court more than 400 days after his employment was termi-
nated. Yount v. Hesston Corp., 464 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (I11. App. Ct. 1984). Incidentally, not
all timing requirements on initial filings are the same under the HRA. See, e.g., 775 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/7B-102(A)(1) (2008) (noting that an aggrieved party within an article 3 claim
(e.g., real estate transactions) must file with the Department "within a year after the date that
a civil rights violation allegedly has been committed or terminated"). Do certain civil rights
claimants generally recognize misconduct more quickly than other civil rights claimants?
335. Federal lawmakers may be unable to help much as Congress is constrained by
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S CONST. amend. XIV § 5. Congress only has
the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation," the provisions of equal protection that
limit solely governmental action and the ever changing Commerce Clause authority. Id.
336. Gertz, supra note 30, at 320.
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